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Abstract: Based on Foucault’s analysis of German Neoliberalism and his thesis of ambiguity, the following 
paper draws a two-level distinction between individual and regulatory ethics. The individual ethics level – which 
has received surprisingly little attention – contains the Christian foundation of values and the liberal-Kantian 
heritage of so called Ordoliberalism –  as one variety of neoliberalism. The regulatory or formal-institutional 
ethics level on the contrary refers to the ordoliberal framework of a socio-economic order. By differentiating 
these two levels of ethics incorporated in German Neoliberalism, it is feasible to distinguish dissimilar varieties 
of neoliberalism and to link Ordoliberalism to modern economic ethics. Furthermore, it allows a revision of the 
dominant reception of Ordoliberalism which focuses solely on the formal-institutional level while mainly 
neglecting the individual ethics level. 
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„Nur sechs  Größen order vielmehr Gruppen von solchen 
bleiben als Daten für die gesamtwirtschaftliche Betrach-
tungsweise: Die Bedürfnisse der Menschen; die Gaben und die 
Bedingungen der Natur; die Arbeitskräfte; die Güter-vorräte aus 
früherer Produktion; ferner das technische Wissen und 
schließlich die rechtliche und soziale Ordnung, die den 
Handlungen der Wirtschaftssubjekte Richtung geben kann und 
Grenzen setzt. Dieses letzte Datum muß in einem weiten Sinne 
aufgefaßt werden: Nicht nur die Gesetze, die Sitten und 
Gewohnheiten sind gemeint, sondern auch der Geist, in dem 
die Menschen leben und sich an die Spielregeln halten.“ 
(Walter Eucken 1952/2004: S. 377) 
1. Introduction 
The starting point of my considerations is Michel Foucault’s Die Geburt der Biopolitik. 
Geschichte der Gouvernementalität II (The Birth of Biopolitics. History of Governmentality). 
The book contains Foucault’s lectures at the Collège de France in 1978-1979, where he 
intensively discusses the evolution of neoliberalism in general and German Ordoliberalism in 
particular. On pp. 335, he proclaims the so called thesis of ambiguity, which has received 
surprisingly little attention. In a first step, I will critically reassess this thesis, hint at possible 
strengths and weaknesses of Foucault’s argument and – in a second step – I will refine and 
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advance Foucault’s thesis pointing at a similar two-level differentiation between individual 
ethics  (i.e. individual ethics is understood here in the sense of German Neoliberalism 
exhibiting a dual nature: liberal-Kantian on the one hand and virtue-ethical on the other hand 
referring to the Christian foundation of values.) and formal-institutional ethics (i.e. ordoliberal 
framework policy).
2
The aims of the following essay are multi-layered: a by-product of my critique is to relativise 
and to invalidate the criticism of neoliberalism subsequent to Foucault’s analysis of 
neoliberalism.
 The intention is to retain the strengths of Foucault’s thesis of ambiguity 
without incorporating the weaknesses.   
3
                                                           
2 Individual Ethics correlates to the individual behavior of a person. It refers to an ethics based on internalized moral values 
and self-committed internal norms (i.e. active setup of internal, individual-ethical norms and passive internalization of 
societal, institutional-ethical norms restraining human actions). Key words with regard to the internalized norm system 
grounded in intrinsic motivation are individual self-control, self-commitment and self-regulation. External controls are not 
required; rather, internal sanctions (i.e. inner voice of conscience) are replacing external ones. Individual ethics 
incorporates the Smithian notion of empathy, the Kantian Categorical Imperative (i.e. universalization of mutually 
approvable maxims), deontological or virtue ethics and Christian ethics (i.e. solidarity, benevolence and Christian love). It 
functions as a coordination mechanism within small, club-like communities with face-to-face relationships and a high level 
of social interdependency mainly based on altruism and sympathy (and not egoism) as the basic motives of human action 
(cp. Weise 2000 and Noll 2002: pp. 153).      
 The main aims, however, are the differentiation between dissimilar varieties of 
Regulatory or Institutional Ethics refers to external-formal institutions and the regulatory framework of a society. This kind 
of order of rules ethics is based on incentive-compatible cooperation (i.e. voluntary, reciprocal exchange aiming at mutual 
benefits) and a formal, abstract rule system (as a form of collective self- or rule-commitment) which is capable of solving 
dilemma structures in an incentive-driven and Pareto-superior way. External institutions and coordination mechanisms with 
their (threat of) external sanctions and coercion guarantee norm-conformal behavior. The regulatory framework as a 
cooperation fostering institution sets the incentive structure in which the individuals can pursue their self-interests (i.e. self-
interested motives and not altruistic ones as the basic force of the coordination of interactions). Regulatory ethics is 
especially important in anonymous, loose-knit and large-scale societies where most of the transactions run through markets 
and exchange mechanisms based on value-equivalent compensation (cp. Weise 2000 and Ulrich 2008: chapter 9). One of 
the key features of regulatory ethics are the ethical criteria universal applicability (of rule-based constitutional interests) and 
the ability to reach a (voluntary) common consent (although the universalization requirement is at least as much important 
as in the field of individual ethics (cp. Kant’s Categorical Imperative); see Vanberg 1999/2009 and Noll 2002).     
3 The main accusations concern the all-pervading economization of society (i.e. “… self-sufficiency and autonomy of 
economic rationality, which is forced upon us by the inherent logic of the market. They argue in a reductionist and 
deterministic fashion for a ‘pure’ and ‘value-free’ economics which has no place in its axiomatics for ethical categories” 
(Fearn, James in: Ulrich 2008: p. xiii)), economic imperialism  and the Homo oeconomicus  model. According to  the 
neoliberalism-definition of O‘Malley (2009: 3) et al., neoliberalism consists of the advocacy of the market (i.e. markets as 
autonomous spheres applying to their own rules), the promotion of business-like relations and market governance, the 
economization of formerly non-economic spheres (i.e. commodification and implementation of market-like, self-regulating 
forms of governance; cp. Lemke 2000), the universalization of market-based social relations (cp. Shamir 2008), the 
reaffirmation of individual responsibility (i.e. empowering in a risk-based society; cp. Lemke 2000), economized language 
(cp. Shamir 2008), the differentiation between Government and Governance (i.e. less government, but not less (market) 
governance; cp. Larner 2000) and finally the entrepreneur as the neo-liberal hero (i.e. rational choice actor, Homo 
oeconomicus and the individual equipped with specific resources investing in the competencies of the entrepreneurial self 
and its employability; cp. Heidenreich 2010).  
Some of the objections raised against neoliberalism might be true – no doubt; yet, most of them can be rejected as related to 
German Neoliberalism. E.g. Röpke pushes back against apologetic  economization, economic imperialism,  economic 
narrowing and against fetishism of growth (cp. Röpke 1944/1949: pp. 385) and he explicitly refuses the model of Homo 
oeconomicus (cp. Röpke 1955/1981: p. 447) due to its mere material and egoistic profit seeking and its reductionism (i.e. 
reducing the complexity of human nature while ignoring the multiplicity of human motives of action; see for a similar 
estimation: Eucken 1934: pp. 21 and Rüstow 1957: p. 63, where he (indirectly) argues against pleonexia and chrematistics). 
See also Böhm (1937), where he condemns materialistic individualism, reckless profit-seeking, the glorification of 
economic egoism and the dog-eat-dog-society. As a result, this exploitative and anarchic bellum omnium contra omnes 
leads directly towards the state of massification and a decline in values in general and a decline of public spiritedness in 
particular. In total, the Homo oeconomicus model is far from being the dominant ordoliberal disposition of individuality.    4 
neoliberalism and the connectivity of Ordoliberalism – as one variety of neoliberalism – to 
modern economic ethics. In this regard, the paper tackles the question of a potential 
compatibility between self-interest and public welfare or the common good. The unique 
answer Ordoliberalism gives is that on the supposition of an existing concord of the two levels 
–  individual and formal-institutional ethics –  can the harmony of personal and common 
interests be reached. Equally important is the fact, that the somehow deficient regulatory 
ethics level has to be complemented by the individual and virtue ethics level. With the help of 
a differentiated, less stereotypical and less prejudiced interpretation of Ordoliberalism it 
seems feasible to revise the dominant reception of Ordoliberalism which focuses solely on 
the formal-institutional level while mainly neglecting the individual ethics level (Foucault in this 
context is no exception).    
1.1.1 1.1. Foucault’s Thesis of Ambiguity 
What does the thesis of ambiguity amount to? According to Foucault, Ordoliberalism rests on 
two pillars: the ‘society for the market’ and the ‘society against the market’ pillar (Foucault 
2006: p. 335). The ‘society for the market’ pillar can be paraphrased with the key words 
‘business or corporation society’ (“Unternehmensgesellschaft” (p. 208)) and ‘competitive 
market economy’ (“Wettbewerbsmarktwirtschaft” (p. 248)). Thus, society is shaped by the 
model of entrepreneurship; competition and the Homo oeconomicus model are the ordering 
rationales, and the laws of the market serve as the principles of societal regulation.
4 The 
‘society against the market’ pillar contains one of the central concepts within Ordoliberalism: 
Vitalpolitik (Vital Policy).
5
What are the strengths and weaknesses of Foucault’s thesis of ambiguity? The strengths 
comprise the following aspects: 1. Foucault’s analysis references (correctly) to the inner 
ambivalences and tensions inside Ordoliberalism; 2. It points to the distinctiveness of 
German Ordoliberalism by highlighting the prominence of market-free and non-
commercialised sectors; 3. It admits the separation between the  different varieties of 
  According to Foucault, this component of Ordoliberalism offers 
compensation regarding the cold-hearted, rigorous and severe (competitive) market 
apparatus. The market-free sectors – as one integral component of that pillar – function as an 
anti-thetical counterweight: They supply the need for social integration and restore cultural 
and moral values.   
                                                           
4 Further key words relating to this pillar are: the market as the place of the establishment of truth (“Markt als Ort der 
Wahrheitsfindung” (Foucault 2006: pp. 55)), economic legitimacy of the state (i.e. “legitimacy through wealth”; pp. 124) 
and public authorities under the supervision of the market (p. 168).   
5 See Rüstow 1955; 1961. Rüstow’s concept of vital policy can be described as follows: “… the true purpose of the 
economy lies in the service of values beyond the economy, in the service of human dignity. Vital is whatever promotes the 
vita humana and a life which is worthy of a human being and hence Vitalpolitik takes into consideration ‘all the factors on 
which the happiness, well being and contentment of man truly depend’ (Rüstow)” (Fearns, James in: Ulrich 2008: p. xiii).      5 
neoliberalism in such a way that only Ordoliberalism is equipped with Foucault’s ‘society 
against the market’ pillar or in my terminology: with the individual and virtue ethics level.  
Besides the strengths, there are also some remaining weaknesses of Foucault’s analysis: 
first of all, Foucault misinterprets the means-end-relation of German Neoliberalism and the 
essence of competition and (a socially committed) market economy; second, Foucault 
portrays the two pillars as opposed to each other – according to Foucault, there exists a 
dichotomy and a dualism within Ordoliberalism – instead of an interdependent unity; thirdly, 
further ambiguities are disregarded (e.g. latent tension between liberalism and paternalism, 
between liberalism and the elitist doctrine of the state (i.e. ‘expertocracy’ and meritocratic 
hierarchy) or between (heteronymous) religiosity and Kantian (autonomy-seeking) ethics). 
As mentioned above, it is the aim of the paper to overcome the weaknesses of Foucault’s 
analysis while fostering the strengths of his arguments. The agenda of the paper, therefore, 
proceeds as follows: in the next paragraph the essay tackles the question of what are the 
requirements of an economic and societal order (functionality vs. humanity) referring not only 
to the compatibility of self interest and the common good, but also highlighting the means-
end-relation and the scale of values of Ordoliberalism (chapter 2). In the main part of this 
article (chapter 3) the distinction between individual ethics and formal-institutional ethics will 
be elaborated. It will become clear that the individual ethics level contains the Christian 
foundation of values and the Kantian program of liberty. The Christian and Kantian 
fundament of Ordoliberalism will mainly be explicated by referring to the work of Walter 
Eucken, main spokesperson of the Freiburg School of Law and Economics (i.e. 
Ordoliberalism in the narrower sense). After exemplifying the formal-institutional ethics level 
containing the key features and phrases of Ordoliberalism, chapters 4 and 5 will widen the 
perspective by incorporating the writings of the two main representatives of Ordoliberalism in 
the broader sense, namely Alexander Rüstow and Wilhelm Röpke. The paper ends with a 
summary of my main findings (chapter 6).   
2.1. Workable and Humane Socio-Economic Order 
At the heart of Ordoliberalism lies the question, whether it is possible to implement a 
functioning and humane economic order – an order which serves the Kantian values human 
dignity and self-legislation as well as justice and fairness (i.e. human dignity, freedom and 
justice are regarded as synonyms in most of the ordoliberal publications).
6
                                                           
6 See Eucken 1952/2004: p. 14, p. 166 and p. 369; Eucken 1950/1965: pp. 239; Rüstow 1945/2001: p. 153. 
  Therefore, 
Ordoliberalism tries to solve the dilemma or the conflict of goals between efficiency, 
performance capability and productive capacity on the one hand and (formal) equality and   6 
social justice on the other hand. The primacy of ethics and the primacy of economics have to 
be avoided. Pies speaks in this context of ‘orthogonal positioning’
7, a normative-integrative 
perspective which is capable of conquering the (alleged) antagonism or trade-off between 
freedom, security and social justice (i.e. integrative approach to economic dynamism and 
social cohesion). In order to realise this aim, Ordoliberalism pursues a two-stage argument 
similar to that of Adam Smith: the ideal economic and societal order of Ordoliberalism – the 
so called ‘Competitive Order’ (I will come back to Eucken’s Ordnungstheorie in chapter 3.3) – 
has to be justified by efficiency, allocation and ethical arguments alike pointing at the twofold 
requirements profile of a market-based and at the same time socially embedded competitive 
order. The socio-economic order has to overcome economic shortages and scarcities; it has 
to conquer absolute material poverty, mass unemployment and solve the Social Question; it 
is responsible for satisfying the basic needs of the people and for the maintenance and 
provision of vital goods. Furthermore, the socio-economic order has to be organised in a way 
that it enables an autonomous, self-reliant life in freedom (i.e. Kantian autonomy and liberty) 
and a humane and ‘vital political’ life according to Christian social ethics.
8
What kind of role do market and competition play with regard to the twofold requirements 
profile of the socio-economic order? 
 What is essential 
here is the fact, that the criterion of functionality and the criterion of humanity are linked 
interdependently and reciprocally – there is no such thing as a super- or subordination.  
2.2. The Essence of Markets and Competition 
Competition (under the rules), or as Ordoliberalism calls it ‘Leistungswettbewerb’ (competition 
on the merits), is used merely as a tool: the Ordoliberals – Eucken and Böhm as well as 
Rüstow and Röpke –  regard competitive markets as instruments of emasculating power 
(“Wettbewerb als Entmachtungsinstrument”)
9
                                                           
7 Pies 2001: pp. 130. 
; they are important control mechanisms. 
Furthermore, competition is not an end in itself; rather it is a means to an end (a fact that has 
received little attention among scholars, including Foucault himself). Moreover, it is not only a 
means in economic terms; it is the most prominent and elementary means regarding the 
twofold requirements profile of a socio-economic order (i.e. means-end-relations). As we 
already know, it is the aim of Ordoliberalism to establish a functioning and humane order of 
rules. Competition now serves as a hinge (i.e. Scharnierfunktion): it enables the 
8 See Eucken 1952/2004: p. 199. 
9 See Böhm 1961: p. 22; Eucken 2001: p. 83; Lenel/Meyer 1948: XI.    7 
accomplishment of the economic as well as the ethical goal
10
All this goes along with a negation of a one-sided absolutization of economics: Ordoliberalism 
strives for an economically and ethically justifiable order!
: on the one hand, competition 
enhances economic efficiency and the performance capability of a market economy. It 
increases the innovative and creative spirit and the overall prosperity of an economy 
(economic goals). Furthermore, competition creates the material prerequisites for the 
realisation of (positive) freedom (i.e. competition as a complement of freedom). By removing 
market powers, by dissolving concentration of power and by minimising coercion, competition 
and market mechanism make room for the free development of the individual in economic, 
social and cultural regard: they protect civil rights and liberties (i.e. freedom through 
competition) and thus, safeguard human dignity.  
11 Therefore, Ordoliberalism cannot 
be blamed for super-elevating normative economic aspects or for neglecting the Zweck- or 
Lebensdienlichkeit of the market economy (market economy’s ability to serve).
12 
Ordoliberalism incorporates economic and ethical control mechanisms alike – reminding the 
reader of Smith’s Wealth of Nations and Theory of Moral Sentiments: the market form of 
complete competition, the principle of accountability and liability, the principle of market 
conformity  –  to name just a few economic control variables.
13
3. Individual Ethics and Regulatory Ethics 
  On the ethical side the 
Christian foundation of values acts as a control device (cp. chapter 3.1).  
„Christen sind zu erheblich mehr verpflichtet als zur Innehaltung 
der allgemeinen Ordnungsgrundsätze“  
Constantin von Dietze (unter Mitarbeit von Böhm, Eucken und 
Ritter) 1946/1994: S. 368 
 
The two-level distinction between individual ethics and regulatory ethics is not an invention by 
the author; it is part of the oeuvre of at least two of the most prominent ordoliberal thinkers – 
namely Wilhelm Röpke and Walter Eucken.
14
                                                           
10 Röpke (1942: p. 170) differs between material (i.e. raised standard of living) and immaterial gains (i.e. guarantee of 
freedom, personal independence and security, social justice) resulting from a competitive market economy. And Müller-
Armack (1972/1981: pp. 163) adds the creation of social cohesion, the solving of social conflicts and the easing of tensions 
as further immaterial gains of a competitive order (i.e. Social Market Economy as a peace-making ordering); see also 
Wohlgemuth 2008: pp. 73 (i.e. ethics of competition: competition as a result and expression of individual liberty and 
private autonomy, competition as a result and cause of the emasculation of privileged (market) power, and competition as a 
source of unintended good works for unknown others). 
 E.g. Röpke differentiates in his work Civitas 
11 Referring once again to the two-stage argumentation of Ordoliberalism. In total, the ordoliberal competitive order is on 
both levels – the economic and the ethical one – vastly superior compared to the centrally administered economy (see 
Dietze/Eucken/Lampe 1941/1942: pp. 40). It can provide the society with material as well as immaterial gains.    
12 Cp. Ulrich 2008. 
13 See also Eucken’s Constituent and Regulative Principles in Eucken 1952/2004. 
14 See also Böhm 1937: here, Böhm pleads for a combination of a highly efficient and productive economy and a society 
based on noble sentiments and public-spiritedness at the same time. Furthermore, he points at the embeddedness of the 
economic process into a broader context of a moral and legal order.     8 
Humana between a formal-institutional and a moral-psychological level (p. 28) respectively 
between material-institutional and immaterial control mechanisms and counterweights (pp. 
202). Eucken on the other hand remarks that the legal order and the state of the market 
alone are not sufficient – an adequate individual ethics and adequate moral standards are 
needed as well in order to complement the legal order (cp. Wirtschafts- und Sozialordnung 
(Economic and Social Order) and Nationalökonomische Fibel  (National Economic Primer; 
both written in co-authorship with von Dietze and Lampe
15
Let’s take a closer look at the two levels and their characteristics: the formal-institutional or 
regulatory level encompasses the typical ordoliberal framework, ordering policy and Eucken’s 
so called competitive order. In chapter 3.3 I will analyse this level in more detail. So far, it is 
important to note, that the regulatory level has to be supplemented by the individual ethics 
level due to its eventual deficiencies. This second level – the so called individual or virtue 
ethics level  –  can be subdivided in two sections: the first type of individual-ethical self-
commitment refers to the religious-sociological background (i.e. Christian foundation of 
values) while the second one refers to the liberal-Kantian heritage of Ordoliberalism (i.e. 
Kantian understanding of autonomy, freedom and idea of man). This two-level distinction 
between individual and regulatory ethics is reminiscent of Smith’s formal and informal control 
mechanisms and sanctions (i.e. institutionalized competition and market mechanisms, ‘truck, 
barter and exchange’, entering into contracts vs. impartial spectator, the notion of sympathy 
and informal norms of conduct/social discipline via the general public
). What is essential here is that 
both levels are not super- or subordinated to each other; rather, both Eucken and Röpke 
highlight the interplay, the equal status and the interdependent complementarity between 
individual and regulatory ethics. No dichotomy can be detected, as assumed by Foucault et 
al. 
16). Furthermore, this 
distinction underlines the normative, meta-ethical embeddedness of Ordoliberalism and 
Social Market Economy
17: according to the ‘interdependency of orders’ (Eucken), the 
economic order is invariably integrated in a higher meta-economical societal order.
18
From an economic-ethical perspective we can conclude that the economic plays of the game 
of the economic subjects are not (!) free of morality and that the systematic place of the moral 
in a free (and socially committed) market economy is not only the basic order or in our 
 
                                                           
15 Cp. Dietze/Eucken/Lampe 1943/2008: p. 110; Dietze/Eucken/Lampe 1941/1942: p. 101 and pp. 119. 
16 Cp. Recktenwald 1985: pp. 112 and pp. 380. 
17 I.e. Ordoliberalism as one of the main pillars of Social Market Economy, the socio-economic system implemented after 
World War II aiming at the harmonization and reconciliation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom, market freedom, 
social security, social justice and solidarity (so called synthetic Irenic Formula; cp. Müller-Armack 1956; 1965/1998).   
18 Cp. Eucken 1926: p. 16: “encompassing spiritual or intellectual order” (umfassende(n) geistige(n) Lebensordnung).   9 
terminology: the regulatory-ethical framework; rather  the systematic place of the moral is 
regulatory ethics in combination with individual ethics!
19
Not least the current financial market crisis has shown that the regulatory order is incomplete 
and deficient due to different reasons (i.e. missing competencies of the regulatory bodies, 
information asymmetries, complexity of financial market products, high innovative ability, 
sidestepping or bending the rules (i.e. regulatory arbitrage), inadequate regulation/regulatory 
deficits, etc.). Therefore, the regulatory level alone seems to be not sufficient to prevent 
economic crises, and the question remains open, whether the formal-institutional level has to 
be supplemented by individual and virtue ethics and whether codes of conduct on the 
corporate or branch of industry level are a proper way out of the dilemma?
 
20
In the next paragraphs I will examine the different levels step by step. First of all I will take a 
closer look at the individual ethics level and especially at the religious and Kantian, normative 
foundation of Ordoliberalism.  
  
1.1.2 3.1. Walter Eucken’s Religiosity
21
A good way of approximating Eucken’s understanding of religion is his biography: Eucken 
was a member of the Confessional Church and he was an associate of the Protestant 
resistance movement against the Nazi regime.
  
22  Furthermore, we are aware of certain 
autobiographical notes pointing at the importance of religion in the life of Eucken himself. In a 
letter to Rüstow, Eucken confesses that he could neither live nor work, if he did not know of 
God’s existence and that his Christianity is similar to that of Leibniz and Kant.
23 And while 
attending a meeting of the Mont Pèlerin Society in 1947, Eucken admits that he –  as a 
Christian – is arguing from a Christian standpoint.
24
Besides the autobiographical hints at Eucken’s religiosity and piety, his essays are a further 
proof: in his religio-sociological and crisis-writings like Die geistige Krise und der Kapitalismus 
(Spiritual Crisis and Capitalism) (1926) or Staatliche Strukturwandlungen und die Krisis des 
Kapitalismus (Structural Transformations of the State and the Crisis of Capitalism) (1932), 
  
                                                           
19 Cp. for an opposing view: Homann/Blome-Drees 1992; Buchanan 1987; Vanberg 1999/2009; a drawback of locating 
moral solely in the regulatory framework would be that individuals are totally relieved in terms of ethical and social 
responsibility. Contrary to that, Ulrich stresses the outstanding importance of ethical obligation to provide (Bringschuld) 
(Ulrich 1997/2008: p. 398).  
20 Codes of conduct are discussed by ordoliberal thinkers in the 1950ies and 1960ies at great length: cp. Müller-Armack 
1959; 1961/1976 and Röpke 1958/1961.  
21 Eucken is not the only member of Ordoliberalism which adheres to Christian religion (cp. Goldschmidt 2009); cp. the 
indicated publications of Röpke, Rüstow (and Müller-Armack) in this paper, the primary and secondary literature 
concerning the Freiburg resistance circles and for the protestant roots of Social Market Economy with special emphasize on 
Franz Böhm: see Roser 1998. 
22 Cp. Blumenberg-Lampe 1973; 1986.  
23 Cited in: Lenel 1991: p. 12. 
24 Cited in: Plickert 2008: p.148.    10 
Eucken bases his argument on Christian values. Moreover, he demands an ethical-religious 
renewal and spiritual reformation in order to overcome the societal crisis of the present (i.e. 
religiöse Erneuerung and Re-Christianisierung). The so called Gesellschaftskrisis der 
Gegenwart
25  is a state of social ‘massification’, mass existence and ‘stereotyping’ 
(Vermassung), proletarianisation and disintegration. The reason for the ethical vacuum and 
nihilism – accompanied by decadence and a decline in values – is the loss of the religious 
ways of life respectively the suppression of religion in the public sphere. Röpke and Rüstow 
speak in this context of ‘Erbgutverbrauch’ (i.e. wastage of the socio-cultural inheritance; loss 
of Christian-humanist values
26) and they envision the potential danger of being incapable to 
regenerate the traditional constitution.
27
In his essay Religion – Wirtschaft – Staat (Religion – Economy – State) (1932) Eucken offers 
the reader new insights into his Protestant piety when he emphasizes the personal or private 
relationship between the individual and God
  According to Eucken, Röpke and Rüstow, the 
present situation requires a religious-spiritual reformation, a re-Christianization and the 
creation of a new social way of life, which will allow the spiritual crisis to be overcome and the 
ethical-religious vacuum to be filled.  
28  while criticizing the institutionalization of 
religion in general and the churches in particular.
29
In his Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik (Principles of Economic Policy), Eucken discusses 
the potential ordering role of religion – besides science and the state – and in the already 
  Yet, the unique mixture of (New) 
Protestantism and Catholicism –  autonomy of the divine soul, inwardness and religious 
conscience vs. supra-individual indebtedness to social orders and institutions (i.e. family, 
marriage, community, and the state) – is present in the ordoliberal writings as well.    
                                                           
25 In his early works (e.g. Tatwelt-essays), Eucken often speaks of ‘crisis of capitalism’ and ‘spiritual crisis’. In his late 
works however, e.g. in his Grundsätze-book, he frequently refers to the term of massification.  
26 See Röpke 1942; Rüstow 1952/1963; 1957; 2001; Müller-Armack 1948/1981. Further individual and institutional-ethical 
causes of the Gegenwartskrisis, a status of cumulative anonymity (i.e. “state of termites” (Röpke 1944/1949: p. 33)), de-
humanization, uprootedness, ethical decadence, nihilism and spiritual vacuum (filled by Ersatz religions and leading to a 
period of an upheaval of norms and traditions), are: the pathological governmental form of pluralism (i.e. public authorities 
as preys in the hands of interest groups; cp. Rüstow 1932/1981: p. 224; 1957: p. 178; 2001: p. 108: “Interessentenhaufen” 
(see also Lippmann 1945: pp. 165), “Der Staat als Beute”, “Füttern der Interessenten aus der Staatskrippe”, “Chaos einer 
pluralistischen Beutewirtschaft”); re-feudalization, corporative state and plutocracy; degeneration and distortion of the 
market economy towards monopolistic, subsidized and interventionist capitalism (i.e. distinction between market economy 
and capitalism as “Neo-mercantilism” (Rüstow 1945/2001: pp. 115)); economization and technocracy (“The Cult of the 
Colossal” (Röpke) and “megalomane Elephantiasis” (Rüstow)); and finally, structural changes following the industrial 
revolution (i.e. increasing importance of global players, amalgamation, mergers and acquisitions; division of labor; 
specialization in the age of machinery and technology; urbanization and population growth). The topic of 
Gesellschaftskrisis is also indirectly addressed by Franz Böhm, co-founder of the Freiburg School of Law and Economics: 
cp. Böhm 1946; see in general: ‘The Good Society’ (cp. Lippmann 1945) as the birth of neoliberalism.    
27 Cp. Rüstow 1957: p. 184. 
28 The concept of personhood (in German: Personalität or Personalismus), so prominently represented by Catholic social 
ethics, might be a possible linkage between ordoliberal religiosity and their Kantian understanding of liberty; see for a 
similar combination of Kantianism and Catholic and(!) Protestant religiosity: Rudolf Eucken 1922: p. 50.  
29 Cp. for a similar argument: Rudolf Eucken 1901: pp. 15.    11 
talked about work Wirtschafts-  und Sozialordnung  (written together with von Dietze and 
Lampe) the authors not only mention the term individual ethics (in this case, the writers 
condemn the rape and mutilation of individuals, mammon worship, unjust distribution and 
exploitative wages, and they distance themselves from capitalism) which has to supplement 
the legal and market order of society; they also demand an ordoliberal post-war socio-
economic order based on Christian values (i.e. Christian humanist liberalism).         
1.1.3 3.2. Eucken’s Kantian Concept of Liberty
30
Euckens understanding of liberty bears remarkable (terminological and content-related) 
resemblances to the writings of Immanuel Kant.
 
31 Especially Eucken’s ORDO papers from 
1948 and 1949 are fundamental for this: Das ordnungspolitische Problem (The Regulatory 
Problem) and Die Wettbewerbsordnung und ihre Verwirklichung (The Competitive Order and 
Its Realization).  At the heart of Eucken’s discourse on liberty are the (Kantian) terms 
autonomy
32, self-legislation and self-determination (always linked with the term human 
dignity). The aim is to overcome immaturity and to reach the state of personal enlightenment 
and emancipation. In this regard, Eucken opposes socio-economic and political dependency, 
oppression and exploitation.
33  Liberty is, therefore, incompatible with totalitarianism and 
imperialistic systems. Furthermore, it cannot be reconciled with the process of social 
‘massification’ and ‘stereotyping’, whereby the individual’s personality is ‘expunged’ and a 
wide-scale ‘de-souling’ (Entseelung) and ’de-individualization’ (Entindividualisierung) takes 
place.
34
Besides the already mentioned topic of the societal crisis of our time, Eucken’s program of 
liberty is highly related to the subject of historism: Eucken’s essay of 1938 entitled Die 
Überwindung des Historismus (The Conquest of Historism) seizes on the topos of the social 
crisis and links it neatly with the Kantian understanding of liberty and rationalism.
 In the wake of such a development, the individual becomes increasingly incapable of 
expressing his or her right to self-determination.  
35
                                                           
30 Cp. for more information about the (Neo-)Kantianism of Rudolf Eucken: Rudolf Eucken 1901; 1950: pp. 370 and p. 391 
and Rudolf Eucken (without publication date): pp. 82-94 (i.e. Kantian realm of freedom and critical-mature thinking).  
 Eucken, 
by taking the fight to historism and criticizing the irrationalism it represents, draws a direct 
31 The parallels between Kant (cp. Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals) and Eucken can be found on the following topics: 
understanding of liberty (almost identical definition of freedom: cp. Eucken 1949: p. 27; Eucken 1952/2004: p. 48, 176 and 
360); significance of autonomy, maturity, and the faculty of reason and prudence (Eucken’s belief in rationality becomes 
clear when he criticizes historism for its irrationalism and relativization of the notion of truth (cp. Eucken 1938)); the idea 
of man (i.e. each individual is regarded as an end in itself, it is no means to an end.  Kant, Eucken and Röpke are 
condemning the instrumentalization, exploitation and functionalization of the individual; each person is a subject, and no 
object, instrument or tool (cp. Röpke 1944/1949). In this regard, Eucken as well as Röpke are referring to the Kantian 
Categorical Imperative (Formula of the End in Itself) and attaching great importance to the term human dignity).   
32 Cp. Böhm’s concept of Privatautonomie in: Böhm 1966/1980. 
33 Cp. Eucken 1932a; 1932b; 1948a. 
34 Cp. Eucken 1932a: p. 86. 
35 Cp. Kant 1977b.    12 
parallel to the tradition of the Enlightenment. Eucken specifically accuses the proponents of 
historism, such as Sombart, Gottl-Ottlilienfeld and Spann, of expounding a fatalistic, 
deterministic and romanticized ideology. Eucken warns against the relativization of values, 
the relativization of the notion of truth, the relativity of knowledge and the danger that science 
will lose its ordering function (relativism accusation). Furthermore, he criticizes skepticism 
and the mistrust several historicists have towards the ratio (irrationalism accusation).
36
Since Eucken’s program of liberty is analyzed elsewhere
  
37, I will only briefly summarize 
Eucken’s actual understanding of liberty: Liberty is – according to Eucken – a constituent of 
human existence.
38  Liberty is closely connected with humanity, human dignity and social 
justice.
39 In addition, liberty is not limitless or anarchic; individual liberty finds its boundary 
where another’s sphere of liberty begins.
40 Moreover, there is no absolutization of liberty; 
contrary, there are several limits not least the Christian value system. For Eucken, liberty 
must always be coupled with a comprehensive sense of responsibility towards oneself and 
towards others (i.e. double form of responsibility: individual and  social responsibility
41). 
Finally, liberty is not just limited to negative freedom  (i.e. freedom from coercion and 
intervention) – it also incorporates a positive notion of liberty strongly related to the Kantian 
idea of autonomy
42 – and it is just not limited to economics (i.e. equipment and distribution of 
basic goods and rights of disposition). Liberty is also relevant in a political context
43 and 
taken to mean inalienable basic and human rights enabling the free development of the 
individual
44 and closely connected with the term human dignity –  the central (ordoliberal) 
value.  Economic liberty is coupled with consumer sovereignty
45  and the postulate of 
‘coordination’ of individual plans about markets instead of (authoritarian) ‘subordination’.
46 
The economic, liberal ideals, which underlie the basis of this idea, include freedom of 
privileges, non-discrimination and the rule of law.
47
                                                           
36 See Eucken 1952/2004: pp. 340. 
  
37 Cp. Wörsdörfer 2010.  
38 Cp. Eucken 1948a: p. 73. 
39 See Eucken 1948a: p. 73. 
40 Cp. Kant’s definition of liberty in Kant 1977a: pp. 337.  
41 Cp. Eucken 1953: pp. 24. 
42 Cp. Berlin 1995/2006: pp. 197. 
43  Cp. Eucken 1946/1999: p. 18 (i.e. economic and  political freedom); see also Röpke 1944/1949: p. 51,  where he 
emphasizes the primacy of political-cultural  liberalism and the subsidiary role played by economic  liberalism. Cp. 
Rüstow’s critical review of the failure of economic liberalism in: 1945/2001.  
44 Cp. Eucken 1952/2004: pp. 48. 
45 Cp. Miksch 1937/1947: pp. 214, who speaks of ‘autonomous and mature consumers’; see Eucken 1953: p. 15, where he 
argues against the ‘dethronement of consumers’; see Eucken 1950/1996: p. 340, where he classifies them as the ‘directors 
of the economic process’, and Eucken 1953: p. 18, where he speaks of consumers as the ‘actual masters of the economy’ 
(see also Eucken 1948b and 1950/1996: p. 340).   
46 Cp. Eucken 1952/2004: pp. 244. 
47 Cp. Böhm 1966/1980; Vanberg 2008: pp. 7.   13 
At the close of this paragraph we should give Eucken himself the chance to speak. The 
following quotes are taken out of Eucken’s criticism of state interventionism and the 
interventionist state, which again make clear his anti-totalitarian stance. Here, Eucken 
criticizes the “position of power held by the [totalistic], all-pervasive, modern, industrialized, 
technological state” and the “superiority of the  [interventionist and concentrated 
(Vermachtung; Eucken 1932b)] economic state”. The link between political and economic 
power, i.e. the politicization of the economy and the economization of politics, increases the 
danger of abuses of power. In addition, it goes against the central Kantian ideal. Eucken 
notes: “The state monitors and controls economic day-to-day activity and it [...] partly or 
wholly controls the economic machine. Man is merely a small piece of an anonymous, state-
economic machine [...]. The individual becomes a thing and is no longer a person. The 
machine is an end, man the means.” Here, and in other places, Eucken’s advocacy of 
political liberalism becomes clear. He strives to protect the privacy and liberty of the individual 
against state intervention and collective usurpation. He asks: “Which forms of regulation 
guarantee freedom? Which forms can also limit the misuse of liberty? [...] Is it possible to 
create an economic system, in which man is not just a means to an end, not just part of a 
machine?”
48
So far, I have just analyzed the individual ethics level with its two components: liberal-Kantian 
and Christian ethics. In the next section I will complete my differentiation between individual 
and regulatory ethics by pointing at central elements of the formal-institutional ethics level. 
  The answer, which Eucken himself gives, is, of course, the ordoliberal 
competition policy based on Christian values (pointing again at the interconnectivity between 
the different stages of the individual ethics level and between individual and regulatory 
ethics). 
1.1.4 3.3. Regulatory Ethics 
The key words often associated with Ordoliberalism are part of the regulatory ethics level. To 
these belong the differentiation between Ordnungs- and Prozesspolitik
49
                                                           
48 All: Eucken 1948a: pp. 74; cp. Lenel/Meyer 1948: pp. IX: „Wir wollen – besonders nach den Erfahrungen der letzten 
Jahre – von keiner planwirtschaftlichen Ordnung wissen, weil sie die unabdingbaren Freiheiten des Menschen zwangsläufig 
mißachtet und ihn zum Sklaven der Bürokratie macht. Und wir haben auch erkannt, daß schrankenlose[!] Freiheit der 
wirtschaftlichen Betätigung ebenfalls zu Gegensätzen zwischen Einzel- und Gesamtinteresse führt, zur Zusammenballung 
von privater Wirtschaftsmacht, die wirtschaftlich und sozial nicht minder schädlich ist als die staatliche Omnipotenz.“ 
: according to the so 
called Freiburg Imperative, Ordnungspolitik is favoured, which means that the state as a 
legislator and rule-maker (Regelsetzer) –  and not as a major player –  is responsible for 
setting, preserving and maintaining the regulatory framework; i.e.  economic policies that 
institutionally frame in the sense of defining the general terms under which market 
49 See Eucken 1950/1965; 1952/2004; 1999; 2001.    14 
transactions are carried out. In other words: the state has to focus solely on the rules of the 
game (procedure-oriented order of rules) instead of steering, influencing or intervening in 
market processes and the play itself (output-driven/results-oriented order of actions)). The 
aim of Ordnungspolitik (including Eucken’s Principles of Economic Policy
50  and his 
Constituent and Regulating Principles) is  to implement a socio-economic 
Wettbewerbsordnung  (competitive order) which is capable –  as a means to an end and 
together with the rule of law –  of safeguarding individual liberty. Eucken’s Principles of 
Economic Policy demand not only the disempowerment of political and socio-economic 
lobbying or pressure groups; they also ask for Ordnungspolitik and the neglect of 
Prozesspolitik.
51
According to Ordoliberalism, it is essential to discuss the relationship between market and the 
state and to clearly define the state’s tasks and the limits of the state’s responsibilities. The 
ideal state is a strong (i.e. powerful and efficient) and independent (i.e. standing above 
special interest groups) constitutional state
 The latter one is rejected for different reasons: Prozesspolitik is based on 
isolated and ad hoc case-by-case decisions, it functions more or less arbitrarily and 
selectively – and what is most important – it is subject to the particularistic influence of rent 
seeking or special interest groups and their influence on the legislative process (i.e. high 
discretionary leeway for decision making and lacking democratic legitimacy and control). This 
kind of interest groups based policy reduces the overall wealth of a nation (because of 
granting costly and exclusive privileges). Furthermore, it also endangers the liberty of each 
individual. Here, too, we can detect an economic and at the same time ethical argument (cp. 
chapter 2). 
52  which serves as a market police 
(Marktpolizei
53), as an ordering potency or power and as a guardian of the competitive order 
(Ordnende Potenz and Hüter der Wettbewerbsordnung
54
Other major characteristics of Ordoliberalism are the already mentioned Leistungswettbewerb 
(competition on the merits and in terms of better services to consumers
). The state should be able to fend 
off particular interests, keep to the principle of neutrality and confine itself to Ordnungspolitik. 
The underlying liberal ideals are freedom of privileges, non-discrimination and equality before 
the law (quite similar to that of Constitutional Economics). 
55
                                                           
50 I.e. principles of state policy: 1. the state has to limit the power of rent-seeking groups, 2. all state intervention has to be 
policy of the economic order, not of the economic process (and economic and social policy has to be systematic and not ad 
hoc) (cp. Meijer 2007: p. 181). 
) and Wettbewerb 
51 See Eucken 1952/2004: pp. 334. 
52 Röpke 1942: p. 86 and p. 286; Röpke 1944/1949: pp. 76; Röpke 1950: p. 142; Rüstow 1955: p. 63. 
53 Röpke 1942: p. 86; Rüstow 1957: p. 98; Rüstow 2001: p. 54.  
54 Eucken 1952/2004: pp. 325; cp. Röpke 1944/1949: pp. 222.  
55 Cp. Eucken 1952/2004: p. 247, p. 267 and p. 297; see Röpke 1944/1949: pp. 76.    15 
als Entmachtungsinstrument
56  (competition as an instrument of disempowerment) and 
moreover: Röpke’s principle of market conformity (Marktkonformität
57) and economic 
adjustment or adaptation interventions instead of conservation or status quo interventions 
(Anpassungs-  instead of Erhaltungsinterventionen
58). The Ordoliberals themselves are 
searching for a Third Way
59 between social Darwinism of laissez faire on the one side and 
totalitarian collectivism, socialism and Hobbes’ Leviathan on the other side. Their own 
description is that of Social Liberalism (Sozialliberalismus
60), Economic Humanism 
(Wirtschaftshumanismus
61) or the integrative Irenic Formula of the Social Market Economy
62
To summarise, the individual-ethical conception of liberty which is based on the often ignored 
religiosity as well as Kantianism is interlinked with the regulatory ethics level with the aim to 
safeguard the individual-ethical ideals. Regulatory ethics is therefore a guarantor of freedom 
(as the cornerstone of Kantian ethics), human dignity and justice. In the next paragraph I will 
further elaborate the distinction between individual and regulatory ethics by focusing on the 
writings of Alexander Rüstow and Wilhelm Röpke, two other important representatives of 
German or Sociological Neoliberalism.   
. 
4. Wilhelm Röpke 
Typical of the publications of Röpke is his distinctive combination of revolutionary radicalism 
on the one hand and conservatism on the other hand
63: His radicalism becomes clear when 
we take into consideration his anti-capitalistic stance.
64 According to Röpke, capitalism as the 
de facto status quo is a historical degeneration and distortion of the market economy pointing 
at the difference between capitalism – which has to be overcome – and market economy – 
which has to be preserved (a distinction neglected by Foucault et al.). As with Eucken and 
Rüstow
65
                                                           
56 See Böhm 1961: p. 22; Eucken 2001: p. 83 and Lenel/Meyer 1948: p. XI. 
, Röpke refuses (stock) corporations, limited liability companies (i.e. violation of the 
57  Cp. Röpke 1942: pp. 252; 1944/1949: pp. 77 and p. 350; market-conforming instruments are measures which are 
compatible with the market economy; they are not abolishing the working of the price mechanism.  
58 See Röpke 1942: pp. 295; Röpke 1944/1949: pp. 77; Rüstow 2001: p. 51.; adjustment interventions contain measures 
which make the adjustment process less painful and quicker.  
59 See Oppenheimer 1933 and Rüstow 2001: pp. 43. 
60 Rüstow 2001: p. 50. 
61 Röpke 1944/1949: p. 46.  
62 Müller-Armack 1956.  
63 Cp. Röpke 1944/1949: p. 25; see also Rüstow 2001: pp. 57. 
64 See also Eucken 1927: pp. 131: Eucken rejects capitalism because of its incompatibility with religion and Christianity 
and because of its capitalistic and utilitarian calculation. Eucken writes: „Tatsache ist weiter, daß dieser Kapitalismus eine 
große Maschinerie darstellt, die in ihrem Wesen mit der Religion unvereinbar ist. […] Eingespannt in eine gewisse 
Sklaverei anonymer Verhältnisse beobachtet der Einzelne mit Recht überall die Herrschaft des kapitalistischen Kalküls. 
[…] Utilitarismus und Relativismus als Zerstörer des Geisteslebens […]. Wir stehen heute nicht, wie so oft fälschlich 
gesagt wird, in einer Epoche der Umwertung aller Werte, sondern der Beseitigung aller Werte überhaupt – bis auf einen: 
den des Nützlichen“; see also Dietze/Eucken/Lampe 1941/1942: p. 47 and 1943/2008: p. 106, where they even avoid using 
the term ‚capitalism’ at all.  
65 Cp. Rüstow 1957: p. 180, where he compares the GmbH with a robber band.     16 
principle of liability
66
The anti-capitalistic stance in Röpke’s (and other ordoliberal) writings is interlinked with the 
significance of market-free sectors as counterweights to the market economy.
), patent laws  (i.e. monopolization via patenting), and multi-national 
corporations (i.e. enormous potential of power and ability to abdicate responsibility). Röpke 
and other ordoliberal thinkers are pleading for the fostering of the small and medium sized 
business sector – the so called Mittelstand –, a broad distribution and diffusion of private 
property and decentralisation of power structures. The ordoliberal conservatism relates to the 
indispensable primary organizing principle of market economy and competition. This principle 
has to be conserved – although it has to be purified and the capitalistic elements have to be 
‘washed up’. Furthermore, the ordoliberal conservatism relates to the Christian foundation of 
values (cp. chapter 3.1).  
67
Besides the market-free sectors which hint at the individual ethics level, Röpke is more than 
clear, when he writes, that the constitution of the market, the strong state as a market police 
and the rule of law are not sufficient in order to reach the ordoliberal goals (e.g. realisation of 
the Kantian ethics of ensuring independency and liberty of the individuals). What is needed is 
not only the legal, political, formal-institutional regulatory framework. In addition, what is 
needed is an ethical framework and an (individual) economic ethics
 Economic 
policy and the non-commercialised social policy form a unified whole. Therefore, Foucaults’ 
thesis of ambiguity (i.e. society for the market vs. society against the market) is absolutely 
correct – however, Foucault is misled when he assumes that both pillars are diametrically 
opposed to each other, rather than interdependently connected.  
68
The competitive economy is described as a Moralzehrer (a system which drains and erodes 
morality and tends to undermine social cohesion
, ergo a combination of 
individual and regulatory ethics or a triad of law, economics and ethics (i.e. extra-economic 
framework of moral, legal, political and socio-economic conditions)! 
69
                                                           
66 Cp. Eucken’s Constituent Principles in: Eucken 1952/2004; see also Miksch 1937/1947: p. 56 and p. 220. 
). It requires (external) moral standards 
and ethical norms which are generated outside the market economy. The ‘normative 
reserves’ cannot be ‘produced’ within the economic system. Moreover, the market is part of a 
67 Cp. Röpke 1942: p. 187; Röpke 1950: p. 212; the appropriate mixture consists of an enforcement of markets (i.e. opening 
and liberalisation of markets and maintenance of competition; Marktdurchsetzung) and a limitation/  demarcation and 
governance/steering of markets according to ethical-normative criteria derived from vital policy (Marktbegrenzung and 
Marktlenkung) respectively a field of tension between competition and vital policy (cp. Ulrich 1997/2008: pp. 366).    
68 Cp. Röpke 1942: p. 86 and p. 286. 
69 Röpke 1942: p. 86; Röpke’s preface (in: Lippmann 1945): because of the assumed fact that ethical norms tend to be 
endangered in a market economy, Röpke demands a ‘steady renewal of the meta-economical moral funds’ (p.  33); see for a 
similar argument: Müller-Armack 1946/1976: p. 127; 1962/1976: p. 298 and 1952/2008: pp. 460. In this essay, Müller-
Armack highlights the significance of religion when he alludes that the regeneration of values can only be achieved via 
(Christian) religion and that the Social Market Economy has to be filled with a Christian ethos. Besides religion, social 
policy is in demand to implement (non-economic) stabilizers as part of the so called Second Phase of Social Market 
Economy (cp. Müller-Armack 1955; 1960/1981).   17 
higher social order – beyond supply and demand (Jenseits von Angebot und Nachfrage)
70 
and economic life does not take place within an ethical vacuum. Economic integration 
expects an (a priori) outer-economic (social) integration (i.e. need for non-economic forms of 
integration).
71
To put it differently: egoism has to be cleared and restrained; it has to be channelled into 
canals which foster the common good.
 A basic pre-disposition to trust and other social norms must be present and be 
perceived for a cooperative equilibrium to prevail.  
72 ‘Egoism’ has to serve the general public. And the 
way to do this is the ordoliberal competitive order (i.e. regulatory ethics) in combination with 
economic ethics and ethical norms (i.e. individual ethics). There are certain preconditions 
(and barriers) of the market economy which have to be recognized – otherwise the market 
economy cannot fulfil its steering functions. Competition and concurrence, but also economic 
ethics in the sense of ‘moral capital’ are among those assumptions. Concurrence 
mechanisms demand an ethical fundament and a minimum of ethical standards.
73 Röpke 
mentions several trans-economic values – virtues that lie beyond the economy and that serve 
human dignity –  which have to be met
74: community spirit, civic mindedness, sense of 
responsibility, honesty, fairness, moderation and self-discipline, respect of human dignity, 
solidarity, benevolence and Christian love respectively love of neighbour.
75 In this context, 
the bonding forces of the family, churches and local communities (i.e. neighbourhood and 
clubs)
76
                                                           
70 Cp. Sally 1996: p. 8: “Ropke and Rustow [sic!] were concerned with the sociological preconditions for successful 
economic reform, the ethical environment required for a sustainable market order and, at base, the non-economic 
foundations of society – ‘what lies beyond supply and demand’.” 
 as well as parenting, education and religion are of eminent importance in case of 
embedding and enclosing markets. They are primarily responsible for the generation of these 
normative reserves –  provided that a social policy is carried out which allows for a de-
proletarianisation, de-massification, re-agrarianization, support of small and medium sized 
(handicraft) companies and decentralisation of socio-political structures (according to the 
principle of subsidiarity). The overall aim is the social embeddedness of each individual and 
the satisfactory ‘vital situation’ (Vitalsituation). In this regard, self-responsibility, 
independency, self-employment and the diffusion of private property (i.e. private property not 
only fosters independency and autonomy; moreover, it provides the necessary material 
71 Cp. Lenel 1991: p. 13: In a letter from Eucken to Rüstow dating from December 1943, Eucken admits: “The economic 
order is not able to render the people more ethical. That has to be achieved by other forces. However, the economic order 
should guarantee the freedom of each individual such, that the person can act this way or that way and in a self-responsible 
manner” (my translation).  
72 I.e. channelling market economic development along a socio-ethical path and creating an economic and regulatory 
framework with a Christian and humanitarian outlook.  
73 Cp. Watrin 1999/2009: pp. 241. 
74 Cp. Röpke 1950/1981: p. 52. 
75 Cp. Foucault’s thesis of ambiguity and his ‘society against the market’ pillar. 
76 See Röpke 1942: p. 86.   18 
foundations for the de facto realisation of positive rights of freedom) have to be promoted and 
encouraged as well as equal opportunities and equal starting conditions (Startgerechtigkeit). 
Another aspect of Röpke’s individual ethics level which I would like to add is the so called 
‘Deontology of Profession and Occupation’ (Deontologie des Berufs
77) referring to the model 
of the honourable merchant (i.e. professional honour; honour as a nobleman). This codex of 
tradesman’s morality is an excellent application example of individual ethics.
78
5. Alexander Rüstow 
 
A similar combination of individual and regulatory ethics can be found in the oeuvre of 
Alexander Rüstow, a further member of extended Ordoliberalism or, as it is often referred to, 
Sociological Neoliberalism.  
Starting point of Rüstow’s argument is the failure of paleo-liberal economic liberalism 
(‚Versagen des Wirtschaftsliberalismus’
79). Economic liberalism alone – according to Rüstow 
and Ordoliberalism – is not sufficient. What is required is a political, democratic and socio-
cultural liberalism. Furthermore, formal-institutional and sociological requirements have to be 
met in order to secure the convergence between self-interest and the common good. Rüstow 
often speaks of the required counterweights of the concurrence mechanism, i.e. strong, 
framing (outer-market) integrative appeal (i.e. religion, family, et al.
80). The  importance of 
ethical bonding forces reminds the reader of Foucault’s ‘society against the market’ pillar. 
Like Röpke, Rüstow stresses the existence and the prominent role of meta-economic 
values
81  like solidarity, benevolence, Christian love, justice and freedom (!) and of the 
societal auxiliary conditions of the market society. Markets and the economy are designed to 
serve the community (and meta-economic normative values). They are subordinated and 
taken as the means to an end (Dienende Funktion des Marktes
82). The end in itself is the 
Vitalsituation and the ‘boundary of the market’ (Marktrand).
83
                                                           
77 Cp. Röpke 1958/1961: p. 189. 
  Noteworthy is that the 
economy’s role is to serve the people and not vice versa. The task of public policy is a (meta-
78 Cp. for more information about codes of conduct, business ethics and Ordoliberalism: Müller-Armack 1959; 1961/1976; 
Simma/Heinemann 1999/2009. 
79 Cp. Rüstow 1945/2001; 1961; 2001: p. 99. 
80 Cp. Rüstow 2001: pp. 27 and p. 90. 
81 Cp. Müller-Armack 1948/1981: p. 447 and 506. 
82 Cp. Rüstow 2001: pp. 142 and chapter 2.2; Rüstow 1960; see also Dietze/Eucken/Lampe 1941/1942: pp. 119. Here, 
Eucken, Lampe and von Dietze allege that the economy has to serve the people, the present as well as the coming 
generations.   
83 “This term [Marktrand] emphasizes that the market is only a means to an end, whereas the Marktrand designates those 
areas of human life which are an end in themselves and possess a human value of their own. They are a ‘hundred times 
more important’ (Rüstow) than the market itself, as they are decisive for the development of cultural and educational 
patterns and the moral and social guidelines of behaviour” (Fearns, James in: Ulrich 2008: p. xiii). Thus, competition and 
market economy have to be bounded and moderated according to “vital-political oriented Ordoliberalism” (Ulrich 
1997/2008: p. 378).    19 
economical) amendment and design of the Marktrand and – what is equally important – a 
demarcation of the market boundaries.
84 That is what Rüstow calls Vitalpolitik (vital policy). 
Moreover, Rüstow not only demands the primacy of meta-economic values, he also states 
that it deems valid to offer a sacrifice in economic terms in order to support and enhance 
meta-economic values.
85
6. Concluding Remarks: The Special Role of Individual Ethics 
   
The starting point of my argument was Foucault’s analysis of neoliberalism in general and the 
thesis of ambiguity  in particular. Following Foucault, German Neoliberalism rests on two 
pillars: the ‘society against the market’ and the ‘society for the market’ pillar. This thesis has 
several strengths and some weaknesses. My purpose is to maintain and strengthen the 
advantages of Foucault’s study while at the same time to abandon its disadvantages. 
Foucault is absolutely right when he points at the ambivalences and tensions inside 
Ordoliberalism; he is right when comments on the meaning of market-free and non-
commercialized sectors (cp. chapters 4 and 5 on Rüstow and Röpke), and when he 
distinguishes between divergent varieties within the neoliberal movement (i.e. Freiburg 
School of Law and Economics vs. Chicago School and Monetarism). However, Foucault 
seems to be misguided with regard to the essence of competition and the market mechanism 
(i.e. means to an end and no ends in itself), and what is essential: he is incorrect when he 
assumes a dichotomy
86 between the different levels or stages inside Ordoliberalism. Instead 
of proclaiming a dualism between the ‘society for and against the market’ pillar, it is – from 
my point of view – appropriate to speak of interdependency between the two kinds of ethics: 
individual and regulatory ethics are complementary and they are forming a unified whole.
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84 Cp. Rüstow 2001: p. 62 and p. 100. 
 
Although, I am pursuing a different two-level distinction, my argument is based on Foucault’s 
analysis which allows for an advancement of Ordoliberalism in the direction of modern 
economic ethics: To show the topicality of Ordoliberalism from an economic-ethical 
standpoint, I will only briefly mention some fields of future scientific research: at the heart of 
economic ethics lies the question of whether it is possible to implement an (irenic) socio-
economic order which is capable of meeting the (ordoliberal) criteria of economic functionality 
and ethical humanity (cp. chapter 2.1). Another important task is to solve the potential conflict 
between self-interest and the common good. Here, Ordoliberalism states, that only under the 
85  Cp. Rüstow 1960 and Müller-Armack 1946/1976: p. 84: „Unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Freiheit dürfte die 
Markwirtschaft auch dann noch vorzuziehen sein, wenn ihre ökonomischen Leistungen geringer wären als die der 
Wirtschaftslenkung.“ 
86 Cp. on the contrary Vogt 1999/2009: pp. 275. Vogt’s starting point is the dichotomy between individual and regulatory 
ethics and he aspires a paradigm shift from individual-ethical virtue ethics towards an institutional-ethical Ordnungstheorie.  
87 Cp. Dietzfelbinger 1998: pp. 249.   20 
condition of a far reaching compatibility of individual and regulatory ethics can this state be 
achieved; regulatory and individual ethics on their own are not sufficient! This combination of 
individual and formal-institutional ethics is one of the peculiarities of German Neoliberalism 
which distinguishes it from other varieties within neoliberalism
88
Finally, one question remains open: what is the function of individual ethics? What is the 
crucial role of individual ethics contrasted with regulatory ethics –  especially when 
considering the fact that today the focus (of Constitutional Economics) is on formal-
institutional ethics? First of all it is important to note, that the distinction between individual 
and regulatory ethics so typical of German Ordoliberalism is a characteristic feature of a 
social philosophy which has its roots in a transitional time period with several socio-economic 
caesuras where the formal-institutional level is far from perfect (i.e. deficiencies of the 
regulatory framework). That might be one of the reasons – besides the Christian religiosity of 
the representatives of Ordoliberalism –  for not completely disentangling or detaching 
individual ethics.  
 and which is so important to 
modern economic ethics!         
However, even today, individual ethics has a prominent role to play: we are living in a socio-
economic order with different sub-systems and diverging ordering and regulating 
mechanisms. The market society based on anonymous, loose-knit and large scale society 
mechanisms (i.e. regulatory ethics) exists side by side with club-like and small-scale 
communities of solidarity with their face-to-face relationships (i.e. individual ethics). The (at 
first sight) large-scale societies, therefore, consist of several small group communities relying 
on  individual-ethical norms. Moreover, individual ethics is essential from an economic 
perspective as well: think of trust, self-commitment, reputation, ethical integrity, norms like 
fairness and honesty and all the other secondary virtues. In recent times all these are 
subsumed under the term social capital. It is one of the lasting legacies of New Institutional 
Economics to have elaborated the vital role of individual ethics within the market economy
89: 
It serves as a central precondition for the functioning  of the market mechanism and it is 
providing the market mechanism with ethical reserves so to speak (cp. chapters 4 and 5). In 
some sense, individual ethics is the lubricant of the market society. Finally, individual ethics is 
essential when facing the problem of a deficient and fragmented (cp. the current financial 
market crisis
90
                                                           
88 Cp. Meijer 1987. 
) or non-existing regulatory framework (i.e. institutional vacuum in case of 
89 Cp. the works of North, Putnam, Coleman, Fukuyama et al.; see also Kirchner 1999/2009.  
90 Formal-institutional rules and external norms are quite often missing and only implemented ex post (due to different 
reasons; cp. chapter 3). Thus, until the formal regulation has been institutionalized, individual ethics can fill the institutional 
gap (cp. König 2000); see also Korff 1999/2009: p. 267: “Dennoch kann auch die bestmögliche Rahmenordnung den   21 
revolutionary transitional societies
91) or when there are wide-spread insecurities of how to 
react within state and market-free sectors (i.e. ample scope of behavior). Thus, individual 
ethics is not a matter of perfecting regulatory ethics. Rather, it is essential especially when 
relieving the regulatory framework via self-controlled and self-regulated internalization of 
values (referring to socialization and upbringing)
92 and in order to lower transaction costs (i.e. 
information, decision making and control costs). Internalized individual-ethical norms are 
much cheaper to control for compared to external-formal norms and sanctions. The 
compliance with formal institutions has to be controlled and violations have to be sanctioned. 
Furthermore, individual ethics is compatible with the principle of subsidiarity relocating 
responsibility from the macro- (i.e. regulatory framework) to the meso- (i.e. Corporate Social 
Responsibility; Corporate Governance Codex or other so called Branchenvereinbarungen/-
kodizes as formalized versions of individual ethics referring again to the interdependency 
between individual and formal-institutional ethics) and micro-level (i.e. codes of conduct; 
honorable merchant).
93
Of eminent importance is the relationship between individual and regulatory ethics: either 
they are complementary to each other which means that they are mutually enhancing and 
reinforcing or they are mere substitutes.
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sittlichen Willen der Subjekte nicht ersetzen. Bleibt diese doch selbst bei größter Regelungsdichte ihrer Natur nach 
fragmentarisch und sonach missbrauchsanfällig. Wer meint, das Recht von der Sittlichkeit völlig ablösen zu können, bringt 
es damit letztlich auch um seine Bestimmung als Instrument der Freiheit.“ 
 If a conflict occurs between internal and external 
forms of motivation, the control and transaction costs are rising tremendously and the danger 
comes about that individual and regulatory ethics replace each other. As a consequence this 
might not only lead to the evasion of external-formal norms, it might also lead to a far-
reaching erosion of informal (Kantian and Christian) norms as well. In case of 
complementarity, informal norms and values enhance, facilitate and encourage the 
adherence of formal norms while at the same time reducing the costs of transactions (i.e. 
controls and sanctions are less likely). Traditions and ethical standards of behavior can 
amend and stabilize formal institutions. Therefore, it must be the aim – in order to minimize 
91 A further problem comes up: formal and informal norms and institutions are subject to diverging rates of change: while 
formal institutions can be changed rapidly respectively straightaway (i.e. revolutionary shock-therapy-like alteration), 
informal institutions are relatively persistent, i.e. the rate of change is slow compared to the one of formal institutions (i.e. 
gradual transition).     
92 The internalization of standards refers to the process of socialization through which attitudes, values, and behavior 
patterns come to be maintained even in the absence of external rewards or punishments. As a result, social norms are 
followed even when violation would be undetected, and therefore unsanctioned, because the moral act, which appears to be 
in conflict with the immediate or direct interests of the actor himself, is valued for its own sake. One motivating force 
behind moral behavior is the desire to avoid feelings of guilt and shame (i.e. internal rewards and sanctions respectively 
self-satisfaction and guilt feelings; cp. Platteau 2000/2006). 
93 By putting the meso and micro level in charge (i.e. industry branch and management level), public authorities have to 
ensure that a process of cartelization does not occur.      
94 Cp. Kiwit/Voigt 1995: pp. 138.   22 
transaction costs –  to develop a regulatory framework which fits the individual-ethical 
standards. As mentioned above, several disadvantages of regulatory ethics (i.e. higher 
control and transaction costs and the possible erosion of individual-ethical norms resulting in 
a further increase in costs) exist, yet, these deficits might be overcome with the help of 
individual ethics. A further aspect of great weight is accentuated by König (2000) when he 
underlines the meaning of individual ethics with regard to the formal-institutional ethical 
genesis and evolution  (Normengenese) respectively further advancement of norms 
(Normenfortbildung) (i.e. socio-cultural foundations of the economic order): design and 
enforceability of the regulatory framework is fundamentally based on individual-ethical norms. 
Here, too, the complementarity between both kinds of ethics is vital; otherwise, the legitimacy 
of formal norms would degrade and the societal acceptance decline (this affects the 
enforceability of institutions as well).
95
My purpose here is not minimize or to downplay the significance of regulatory ethics




it is my aim to stress the overriding importance of the mutual obligation of individual and 
regulatory ethics. And that is exactly the distinctiveness of German Neoliberalism.   
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